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1751 
The Power of Words: A Comment on Hamann and 
Vogel’s Evidence-Based Jurisprudence Meets Legal 
Linguistics—Unlikely Blends Made in Germany 
Mark C. Suchman* 
 
By offering an international and interdisciplinary point of comparison, 
Hamann and Vogel demonstrate that current American forays into 
corpus-based legal scholarship reflect only a small sliver of the full range 
of possibilities for such research.  This Comment considers several key 
branching points that may lie ahead, as the nascent literature begins to 
mature.  In particular, the Comment examines two vexing ambiguities 
in the corpus-linguistic agenda: the first centers on the ambiguous 
meaning of legal “empiricism”; the second, on the ambiguous relationship 
between words and actions.  To achieve its full potential, legal corpus 
linguistics will need to move beyond mere description, to identify 
patterned configurations, to interpret cultural meanings, and to trace 
causal processes.  To do so effectively, researchers will need to look beyond 
legal corpora alone, to explore the varied and complex relationships 
between texts and acts, and between legal institutions and the 
surrounding society. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hanjo Hamann and Friedemann Vogel provide a useful reminder 
that legal corpus linguistics is a global product, not so much made in 
America1 as blended and packaged for local tastes from ingredients 
sourced through a long international supply chain. Not being a corpus 
linguistics scholar, I cannot judge the provenance or quality of those 
ingredients. And not being a comparative law scholar, I cannot judge 
their suitability for local German tastes. However, as an empirical law 
and society researcher and a methodological omnivore, I can certainly 
appreciate an intriguing imported brew, even one unfamiliar to my 
palate and hard to find in my neighborhood.2 
I offer the foregoing disclaimer and appreciation as a preface 
because my comments below center less on the Hamann and Vogel 
essay, per se, than on the broader enterprise of legal corpus 
linguistics—and the themes of this symposium—as refracted through 
the Hamann and Vogel article’s international and interdisciplinary 
lens. As a methodology, American legal corpus linguistics is still in its 
infancy, and like most infants, it is fascinated by the shiny objects 
closest at hand. But Hamann and Vogel’s German comparison 
foreshadows some of the challenges, anxieties, and identity crises that 
legal corpus linguistics will (or should) face as the field comes into its 
adolescence. My commentary focuses on two such challenges in 
particular, both involving ambiguities in the invocation of linguistic 
methods in the empirical study of law: the first centers on the 
ambiguous meaning of legal “empiricism”; the second, on the 
ambiguous relationship between legal words and legal actions. Corpus 
 
 1.  Nor “[m]ade in Germany,” for that matter, although on this point Hamann and 
Vogel certainly deserve a bit of poetic license. See Hanjo Hamann & Friedemann 
Vogel, Evidence-Based Jurisprudence Meets Legal Linguistics—Unlikely Blends Made in Germany, 
2017 BYU L. REV. 1473, 1473. 
 2.  Five Questions for Nina Bandelj, ACCOUNTS (Am. Sociological Ass’n, Wash. D.C.), 
July 2013, at 2, 3 (“I am a methodological omnivore, driven more by empirical questions than 
by specific analytic methods.”). 
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linguistics offers a powerful new tool for the study of law, but the 
nature of its promise will depend in important ways on who embraces 
it and how. 
II. THE AMBIGUITY OF LINGUISTIC EMPIRICISM 
To describe a piece of scholarship as “empirical” is to highlight or 
assert the primacy of objective and systematic observation (or at least 
of intendedly objective and systematic observation) as a warrant for 
the scholar’s truth claims. Polemics, sermons, opinion pieces, and 
philosophical treatises are nonempirical because their primary warrants 
are passion, morality, authenticity, and logic, respectively, rather than 
systematic observation. Surveys, tabulations, experiments, focus 
groups, and ethnographies are all empirical because their primary 
warrants are objectivity and systematicity—even though their 
respective foci, methods, and epistemologies diverge quite radically. 
As a shorthand, one could say that scholarship is empirical if the 
scholar commits to a method of observation and a style of 
argumentation that allows external reality to discomfit the scholar’s 
prior expectations.  
To understand the place of corpus linguistics in legal scholarship, 
one must recognize that the corpus linguist aspires to be empirical, 
whereas the traditional, doctrinal legal scholar does not. Even when a 
linguist and a doctrinalist work from the same corpus of legal text, the 
primary warrants that the two adduce will differ significantly. The 
linguist commits (albeit perhaps only tacitly) to the methodological 
premise that observation of a particular pattern in the text will warrant 
a particular conclusion; the doctrinalist looks to the text for 
inspiration, but ultimately warrants his or her argument on the basis 
of morality, logic, or untested assumptions about policy impact—not 
on the basis of objective and systematic observation. A linguistic 
argument is “correct” when it is borne out by observed patterns in 
the corpus; a doctrinal argument can be “correct” even if the corpus 
is silent, divided, or uniformly wrongheaded—indeed, those are 
precisely the conditions under which the doctrinalist’s skills may be 
most needed. 
As sharp as this distinction between empiricism and doctrinalism 
may seem in principle, however, the dividing lines often become much 
hazier in practice—especially for legal scholars working from legal 
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texts. Doctrinal legal scholars often summarize and synthesize a corpus 
of prior texts, at least to contextualize other less empirical modes of 
argumentation; and empirical legal scholars often explore doctrinal 
implications, at least to motivate particular systematic observations. 
Legal corpus linguistics necessarily occupies this twilight zone, and to 
avoid misunderstandings, legal corpus linguists must give careful 
consideration to the ways in which their enterprise is (or is 
not) “empirical.” 
A. Corpus Linguistics as Empirical Method 
The first and perhaps easiest question is methodological: If 
empiricism requires objective and systematic observation, then how 
should legal corpus linguists observe? Here, Hamann and Vogel 
faithfully capture the spirit of the present symposium when they assert 
that “[m]ethodologically, [corpus research in law] relies on big data 
empiricism.”3 In the interest of brevity, I will not belabor this point, 
except to note that quantitative, computation-intensive “big data 
empiricism” is not the only empirical method for observing legal 
language. Some individual texts may have attributes that are 
qualitatively revealing despite being quantitatively rare. Some 
quantitative patterns become more interesting when juxtaposed with 
qualitative evidence on a particular historical period or social 
community. And some linguistic “big data” become interpretable only 
when linked, through demographic or geographic metadata, with 
other data sources, big and small. So, although academic politics may 
push legal linguists to embrace the cachet of big data empiricism, 
scholarly rigor cautions against fetishizing the computational analysis 
of large corpora to the exclusion of other complementary 
empirical methods. 
B. Corpus Linguistics as Empirical Subject 
A harder definitional question is substantive: If empiricism 
requires objective and systematic observation, then what should legal 
corpus linguists observe? The obvious answer, as Hamann and Vogel 
assert, is legal language—treated “not merely as the medium but as 
 
 3. Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1474. 
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the object of study.”4 But this answer can be no more than partial. 
Even if one accepts, arguendo, Hamann and Vogel’s claim that “[w]e 
cannot speak about legal norms without thinking about how they are 
constructed by and through speech and texts,”5 one must also take 
seriously the injunction from Legal Fact Research that “two sets of 
facts are to be taken into account: the life situations to be regulated, 
and the politics and valuations guiding the regulating activities”; and 
that, “[t]o know them both, the jurist must put himself outside of the 
body of the existing rules.”6 In other words, for many interesting and 
important empirical questions about law, the study of legal language, 
in itself, may not be enough. 
To get a fuller sense of what else legal linguists might observe, 
consider the following simple typology of causes and effects: 
 
Table 1: A typology of legal and extra-legal processes in language 
 
  Effect: 
Cause: 
Law world Social World7 
Law world 1: Autopoietic Law 2: Legal Impact 
Social World 3: Legal Politics 4: Informal Norms 
 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at [114]. 
 6.  Id. at [104] (quoting Max Rheinstein, Comparative Law and Conflict of Laws in 
Germany, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 232, 253 (1935) (emphasis added)). 
 7. I use the label “social world” as shorthand for those aspects of social life that occur 
largely outside formal legal institutions—whether in spontaneous daily interactions or in such 
extra-legal institutional spheres as business, medicine, or politics. This domain of extra-legal 
social activity is approximately equivalent to what German social philosophers would 
call  “lebenswelt,” or the “lifeworld.” See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF 
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: VOLUME TWO: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF 
FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981); EDMUND 
HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY 
(David Carr trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1970) (1954). Elsewhere in the social sciences, it 
carries such labels as “civil society” and “everyday life.”  See, e.g., JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW 
ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY (1994); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENT-
ATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959). Of course, this distinction between a “law world” 
and a “social world” should not obscure the fact that formal legal institutions are themselves 
social.  Nor should it obscure the fact that extra-legal social life is inevitably shaped and 
constituted by law.  Nonetheless, the distinction is often analytically useful (and for most people 
intuitively obvious), because the law world is effectively bounded and demarcated from the extra-
legal social world by linguistic barriers and credentialing requirements that can be bridged only 
via substantial investments in translation and re-presentation. Cf. AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW 
APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988). 
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In Cell 1, we find the core domain of Computer Assisted Legal 
Linguistics (CAL2), as Hamann and Vogel have defined it: 
“[A]nalyz[ing] what judges and other jurists write down and how they 
thus exert power and authority”8 or, somewhat more broadly, 
“studying quantitatively how lawyers create and apply legal rules by 
‘treating doctrine as a quantitative unit.’”9 Significantly, even within 
this “autopoietic”10 heartland, “[g]aps remain”11—perhaps most 
significantly in studying legal language outside the publicly 
documented context of litigation, in the more occluded precincts of 
contractual drafting, statutory and regulatory rulemaking, corporate 
compliance activities, and alternative dispute resolution. 
However, the other cells of the table suggest an even broader array 
of empirical objects that legal corpus linguistics might encompass: In 
Cell 3, we have Nussbaum’s “systematic search into the social, political 
and other fact conditions which give rise to the individual legal 
rules”12; and in Cell 2, his “examination of the social, political and 
other effects of those rules.”13 The former is the domain of political 
scientists in the Law and Society movement, as well as of their 
forebears in the Legal Realist tradition; the latter is the domain of 
policy scholars in the Empirical Legal Studies movement, and also of 
their forebears in the older tradition of Sociological Jurisprudence. 
Cell 4, the most remote from traditional legal scholarship, is 
nonetheless quite familiar to legal anthropologists and sociolo-
gists  who study “private [normative] ordering,”14 “[lay] legal 
 
 8.  Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1494. 
 9.  Id. at 1482 (quoting Bernard Trujillo, Patterns in a Complex System: An Empirical 
Study of Valuation in Business Bankruptcy Cases, 53 UCLA L. REV. 357, 363 (2005)). 
 10.  Id. at 1488; see also AUTOPOIETIC LAW, supra note 7. 
 11.  Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1490. 
 12. Id. at 1477 (quoting Arthur Nussbaum, Fact Research in Law, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 
189, 197 (1940)). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  E.g., Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous 
Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 23 (1981); see also, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER 
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
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consciousness,”15 and “informal dispute resolution.”16 Although these 
three cells rarely generate well-archived corpora of explicitly legal text, 
all three are certainly relevant to the empirical study of legal language. 
Most importantly, Cells 2 and 3 foreground the process of translation 
between legal and extra-legal institutions, while Cell 4 (juxtaposed 
against Cell 1) highlights the sociolinguistic forces that can push the 
law world and the social world out of alignment.17 So, although 
practical logistics may tempt legal linguists to embrace the 
convenience of purely judicial corpora, scholarly rigor cautions against 
fetishizing the language of the courtroom to the exclusion of other 
complementary discourses.18 
C. Corpus Linguistics as Empirical Purpose 
A third definitional question for linguistic empiricism is 
motivational: in deciding how and what to observe, legal corpus 
linguists should also ask why (and to whom) such observations would 
be of interest. As Hamann and Vogel note, “Doctrinal analysis remains 
the mainstay of . . . legal academia, so empirical research strands are 
rarely perceived (let alone absorbed) by the field’s core authorities.”19 
To alter this state of affairs, legal empiricists either must focus their 
 
 15.  E.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES 
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: 
LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); Susan S. Silbey, After 
Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323 (2005). 
 16.  E.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: 
Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 941, 949–53 
(1999); Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute 
Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 777–81 (1994). 
 17.  These empirical problematics are important, but hardly new: The pioneering legal 
anthropologist Paul Bohannan would have recognized tensions along the 1–4 diagonal as 
instances of law being “out of phase with society,” and cycles along the 2–3 diagonal as processes 
of “double institutionalization.” Paul Bohannan, The Differing Realms of the Law, 67 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST, Dec. 1965, at 33, 34–37. 
 18.  Several pieces in this symposium tacitly embrace this prescription, usefully comparing 
legal corpora to corpora drawn from other domains. Indeed, the necessity of such comparison 
lies at the heart of the call for applying corpus linguistics to questions of “original public 
meaning” in constitutional and statutory interpretation. See, e.g., James C. Phillips, Daniel 
M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to 
Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J.F. 21, 29 (2016) (“[A] general corpus could 
confirm that a word or phrase is a legal term of art by showing that its ordinary meaning differs 
from its meaning in legal sources.”). 
 19.  Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1491. 
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empirical methods on questions of doctrinal relevance or must 
enunciate new scholarly questions that are sufficiently compelling to 
carve a nondoctrinal enclave within or alongside the legal academy. 
The former has been the favored strategy of the Empirical Legal 
Studies movement; the latter, the strategy of Law and Society scholars 
in the social science disciplines.20 Either approach, however, demands 
a clear-eyed recognition of the differences among several common 
empirical modes: the descriptive, the configurational, the interpretive, 
and the causal. 
The simplest mode and motive for empirical research is raw 
description: X occurs ten percent of the time; Y occurs twenty-five 
percent of the time, etc. Unfortunately, however, raw description is a 
thin gruel, and those who peddle it are derided as “crass 
empiricist[s]”21 for good reason. At the dawn of a new methodology, 
such unstructured fact-inventories may have a certain appeal, as 
anyone who has ever introduced a preschooler to a magnifying glass 
will attest; but to transmute a collection of empirical observations into 
a body of empirical knowledge requires both an organizing conceptual 
framework and a purposeful investment in synthesis. 
Thus, a second mode of empiricism might be termed 
configurational22—seeking to discern and characterize recurring 
patterns or configurations in a body of empirical observations. Much 
of computational corpus linguistics, including topic modeling and 
colocation analysis, is configurational in this sense (as is personality 
typing in psychology, social network mapping in sociology, 
morphometric taxonomy in biology, and bit-string fingerprinting in 
pharmacology). Significantly, as Hamann and Vogel note, legal 
 
 20.  See Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism: 
Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 555 (2010). 
 21.  William Outhwaite, Naturalisms and Anti-Naturalisms, in KNOWING THE SOCIAL 
WORLD 22, 35 (Tim May & Malcolm Williams eds., 1998). 
 22.  The label “configurational analysis” has emerged largely independently (and with 
somewhat disparate meanings) in several distinct fields of scholarship. Here, I use it generically, 
to refer simply to the empirical identification of recurrent patterns; but this usage maps only 
loosely onto the terminology of any particular disciplinary tradition. See, e.g., Alan D. Meyer, 
Anne S. Tsui & C. R. Hinings, Configurational Approaches to Organizational Analysis, 36 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1175 (1993); Earl S. Schaefer, A Configurational Analysis of Children’s Reports 
of Parent Behavior, 29 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 552 (1965); Andreas Wimmer, Lars-Erik 
Cederman & Brian Min, Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a 
New Global Data Set, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 316 (2009). 
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linguistics in this configurational mode can be qualitative as well as 
quantitative, encompassing small-N methods such as hermeneutics, 
discourse analysis, and linguistic ethnography, as well as large-N 
methods of “calculating recurrent speech patterns . . . using big data 
and semi-automated algorithms.”23 As an empirical agenda, these 
configurational approaches seek to problematize the familiar, revealing 
hidden regularities in texts that have hitherto been studied only for 
their argumentation, not their semantics. The patterns that emerge 
can then be sorted into typologies and their incidence can be mapped 
and theorized over time or across social and geographic space. 
Whereas configurational analysis seeks to problematize the 
familiar, a third empirical mode, interpretation, seeks to familiarize the 
problematic. Most closely associated with the humanities and the 
“humanistic social sciences,”24 interpretation is a common agenda in 
any field that takes culture (including linguistic culture) seriously. At 
its core, interpretation attempts to explore and clarify the meaning in 
social “texts”—broadly defined to include not only formal writings, 
artistic works, and staged performances, but also informal speech acts, 
visual displays, material artifacts, and customary practices. Given that 
“meaning” is ultimately an introspective psychic construct, many 
commentators dispute whether interpretive agendas qualify as 
“empirical” at all, and legal empiricists are often quite explicit in 
distinguishing their own preferred forms of scholarship from 
traditional doctrinal interpretation. But this reaction conflates two 
very different forms of interpretation: interpretation in the humanities 
and interpretation in the social sciences. 
Interpretative research in the humanities, like doctrinal 
interpretation in law, is a largely nonempirical endeavor. The scholar 
may begin with systematic observations (readings) of a text; but the 
goal is less to capture an objective, external reality than to inspire and 
provoke new resonances in the scholar’s own mind and in the minds 
 
 23.  Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1493. 
 24.  The modifier “humanistic” is often used to designate those social science 
disciplines—including anthropology, history, and linguistics—that emphasize particularism 
versus generalization, description versus abstraction, cultural contingency versus physical 
determinism, empathetic understanding versus nomothetic prediction, and hence interpretivism 
versus positivism. Cf. George Casper Homans, The Humanities and the Social Sciences, AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST, Apr. 1961, at 3, 3. 
12.SUCHMAN_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  4:16 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1760 
of his or her interpretive interlocutors. In this humanistic mode, there 
is no “wrong” interpretation of Hamlet (or of the U.S. Constitution); 
just more or less engaging ones.  
In contrast, interpretive research in the social sciences is often 
objective and systematic to the core. The goal here is to uncover the 
“emic”25 meaning of a particular text within a particular cultural 
community in a way that members of that community would 
recognize and endorse. In this latter mode, an interpretation is 
“wrong” if it cannot be confirmed by other researchers studying the 
same subject community with the same methods. Far from being 
nonempirical, such interpretive research is essential to understanding 
the recurring behavioral patterns of self-aware, culture-bearing human 
subjects. Even such apparently objective descriptive statistics as the 
race and gender ratios of a survey sample become empirically tractable 
only after one resolves (by pre-testing or by assumption) the 
inherently interpretive issue of what the relevant questionnaire items 
meant to the survey respondents. And interpretive empiricism is all 
the more necessary when attention turns to the intendedly meaningful 
texts produced and received by shifting discourse communities over 
protracted periods of time. Indeed, for many legal linguists, 
interpretive empiricism may be the main event, not a mere warm-
up act. 
Despite the importance and difficulty of configurational and 
interpretive empiricism, many researchers aspire to a fourth, even 
more demanding mode of analysis, seeking to use objective, systematic 
observation to resolve questions of causality. Causal claims take the 
form “if X, then Y”—or, more forcefully, “because of X, therefore 
Y”—and causal empiricism seeks to test such propositions by 
observing how various Xs (independent variables) correlate with 
various Ys (dependent variables); preferably under statistically or 
experimentally controlled conditions that rule out various prior, 
mediating, coincidental, or reciprocal factors. Taken literally, this goal 
is more daunting than it might initially seem: the more science learns 
about quantum uncertainty, physio-psycho-social over-determination, 
and macro-historical path dependence, the more philosophers debate 
 
 25.  Anthropologists traditionally distinguish between the emic understandings held by 
research subjects and the etic explanations offered by outside scholars. See Marvin Harris, History 
and Significance of the Emic/Etic Distinction, 5 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 329 (1976). 
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whether causal propositions are ontologically meaningful and 
epistemologically knowable even in principle, let alone technically 
resolvable in practice. Nonetheless, humans seem predisposed to 
understand the world in causal terms, and empirical researchers 
routinely and unreflectively slip into the causal register even when 
neither the available methods nor the available data merit such 
presumptions.  Currently, legal corpus linguistics seems somewhat less 
susceptible to this temptation than other empirical approaches that get 
less mileage out of uncovering novel configurations and interpreting 
shrouded meanings; but as the field’s methods and data mature, its 
causal ambitions may grow as well. Hamann and Vogel posit that 
“legal norms . . . are constructed by and through speech and texts,”26 
and they envision an agenda for CAL2 that “analyzes what judges and 
other jurists write down and how they thus exert power and 
authority.”27 These are causal claims about the force of words. To test 
such claims empirically, legal corpus linguists will need to address 
philosophical and methodological challenges that go well beyond 
anything attempted to date.28 
III. THE AMBIGUITY OF LINGUISTIC CAUSATION 
Although I do not propose to resolve the causal ambiguities of 
corpus linguistics here, a brief illustration of one central puzzle may 
 
 26.  Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1486 (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. at 1494 (emphasis added). 
 28.  For a more concrete illustration of how our four empirical purposes differ, consider 
an imaginary traffic planner who arrives in the United States from a distant country. Walking the 
streets, she observes various plaques, mounted in various ways, and bearing various markings. 
Operating in the descriptive mode, she begins to record her observations in a notebook, perhaps 
using categories based on the (possibly irrelevant) practices of her native land. After a while of 
this, she switches to the configurational mode, noting that one particular pattern seems to recur 
more often than others—an octagonal plaque, painted red, bearing the white markings “STOP.” 
Perhaps this is a culturally meaningful symbol, she thinks. So, slipping into the interpretive mode 
(and miraculously developing a fluency in spoken English), she begins to ask passersby what this 
configuration means to them. Most describe it as a stop sign, and some go on to explain the 
legal and normative implications. But our intrepid heroine understands the difference between 
beliefs and behaviors; and she knows that in her homeland, traffic regulations are often widely 
publicized, but equally widely violated. So, to round out her empirical project, she turns to the 
causal mode, designing a series of experiments to determine the effects of such signage on 
American motorists of various ages and genders, under various traffic conditions, at various times 
of day, and in various stages of inebriation. No single element of this imaginary research design 
would generate much knowledge on its own; however, skillfully conjoined, they might yield an 
empirical understanding of American traffic patterns that would surpass the lay intuitions of even 
a lifelong American driver. 
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help to demonstrate the magnitude and importance of the challenge. 
Specifically, any evenhanded approach to legal empiricism must 
acknowledge that what we commonly call “the Law” is neither 
exclusively a corpus of disembodied texts (constitutions, statutes, 
judicial opinions, etc.) nor exclusively a system of embodied practices 
(legislating, policing, litigating, adjudicating, punishing, etc.). Rather, 
Law is a complex institutional amalgam, blending words and actions 
in multiple causal (and noncausal) concoctions. 
To grasp the implications for legal linguistics, consider a second 
simple typology of causes and effects: 
 
Table 2: A typology of linguistic and nonlinguistic processes 





Actions 1: Realism 2: Performances 
Words 3: Performatives 4: Textualism 
 
In Cell 1, we find the core domain of Legal Realism (and of many 
more recent social-scientific approaches to the study of law) where the 
focus falls not on what legal language says “in books” but on what 
legal institutions do “in action.”29 In Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous 
dictum, “If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look 
at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which 
such knowledge enables him to predict.”30 To Holmes and his fellow 
Realists, an excessive focus on legal “phraseology,” “language,” 
“talk[],” and “words” invites us “to drop into fallacy.”31 “[I]f we take 
the view of our friend the bad man we shall find that he does not care 
two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to 
know what the . . . courts are likely to do in fact.”32 Although 
 
 29.  Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). 
 30.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Address at the 
New Hall of the Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law: The Path of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 991, 993 (1997). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 994. 
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Holmes’s somewhat dogmatic presentation elides important aspects 
of real-world human psychology and organizational behavior, it stands 
as an important reminder that some aspects of law—the police officer’s 
baton, the lawyer’s bill, the defendant’s race, the prison’s zip code—
do not “live[] in language.” Many respected researchers have devoted 
their careers to producing empirical knowledge about legal 
phenomena that have very little to do with “speech and texts,”33 and 
it is almost impossible to imagine a linguistic research design that 
could support causal claims about the impact of legal text without 
controlling for such nontextual pathways. 
This cautionary note is particularly important for linguists who 
purport to operate in Cell 4, examining the causal effects of particular 
textual patterns on other textual patterns. The big-data computational 
cachet of corpus linguistics encourages relatively bold leaps from 
correlational data about the co-occurrence of words to causal 
assertions about the force of words. But sometimes words are 
epiphenomena, mere garnishes on outcomes that are predetermined 
by other nonlinguistic factors. If an antidiscrimination statute says that 
physical abilities may not be used as hiring criteria unless they are “job-
related for the position in question and . . . consistent with business 
necessity,”34 then regulatory guidance documents, employee 
handbooks, and applicant rejection letters may also begin to use the 
phrase “job-related and consistent with business necessity”35; but this 
may tell us almost nothing about changes in actual hiring and 
enforcement patterns or in cultural understandings of what constitutes 
a valid job requirement or a viable business model. Indeed, it may not 
even tell us whether the statutory change sparked the other 
documentary changes, or whether instead the legislative use of “job-
related and consistent with business necessity” simply encapsulated an 
understanding that had already emerged in political protests, labor 
negotiations, and out-of-court legal settlements, before being 
verbalized in law. Certainly, textualist causation, of the sort envisioned 
by Cell 4, does sometimes occur; but legal empiricists may vastly 
 
 33.  Contra Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at [114]. 
 34.  Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2012). 
 35.  See, e.g., Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical 
Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), EEOC Notice 
No. 915.002 (July 27, 2000). 
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overstate its frequency and importance if they become so enamored of 
linguistic corpora that they lose sight of the other cells in the table. 
In all fairness, this cautionary note also works the other way 
around, and the Hamann and Vogel article, along with the rest of this 
symposium, should usefully alert conventional Cell 1 scholars to the 
possibility of textual causation—as well as to the ability of corpus 
linguistics to illuminate such causation. Significantly, the potential for 
productive dialog between conventional legal empiricists and 
linguistic legal empiricists may be greatest, not in Cell 1 (where 
linguists’ skills may strike nonlinguists as unnecessary) nor in Cell 4 
(where linguists’ findings may strike nonlinguists as inconsequential), 
but rather in Cells 2 and 3, where words and actions intertwine. 
In Cell 2, we find words as performances—scripted or improvised 
displays that flow from nonverbal events. At the extreme stand 
exclamations: the verbal “Ouch!” that follows a physical hammer 
striking a physical thumb. But of greater research interest are the 
verbal accounts that people provide for their actions,36 and the verbal 
narratives that people construct around their experiences.37 For 
obvious reasons, such accounts and narratives play a crucial role in 
interpretive inquiries into the emic meaning of nonverbal events. 
More subtly, accounts and narratives also play an important role in 
tracing how meanings emerge and propagate within a community—
and for understanding how extra-legal injuries evolve into private legal 
disputes and public political movements, which in turn evolve into 
public policies and, thence, into new legal regimes.38 
Finally, in Cell 3, we find processes in which “the textual work of 
lawyers [should be] taken seriously and analyzed . . . as a . . . 
performative speech act.”39 Performative texts neither merely evoke 
textual responses (as in Cell 4) nor merely describe states of the world 
(as in Cell 2) but rather call into existence new states of the world, 
 
 36.  Courtroom testimony is an obvious example, but account-formation is a fundamental 
social process that occurs in innumerable nonlegal settings as well. Marvin B. Scott & Stanford 
M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 AM. SOC. REV. 46 (1968). 
 37.  Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a 
Sociology of Narrative, 29 L. & SOC’Y REV. 197 (1995). 
 38.  William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . , 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980). 
 39.  Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1494 (distinguishing CAL2 from both traditional 
doctrinal analysis and traditional Legal Realism). 
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conditioned on the textual utterance. The archetype is the 
pronouncement of guilt, an utterance that instantaneously transmutes 
a defendant into a convict.40 Other legal performatives are less 
celebrated but perhaps even more consequential: the definition that 
divides a previously undifferentiated extra-legal category into the 
legally sacred and the legally profane; the ruling that transfers the 
burden of proof from plaintiff to defendant; the subtle linguistic 
signaling that makes one phrase into a holding of law and another into 
mere obiter dicta; the opinion-of-counsel letter that makes a desultory 
background-check into “due diligence.” Indeed, a large amount of 
traditional doctrinal scholarship involves efforts (albeit usually 
nonempirical) to identify which legal utterances are performative and 
which are not. 
Arguably, as Hamann and Vogel suggest, Cell 3 may be the 
domain in which corpus linguistics has the most to offer to empirical 
legal scholarship. Legal performatives have real-world causal force, yet 
they are rarely captured by traditional social science methodologies. 
In making such utterances objectively and systematically observable, 
corpus linguistics brings them within the perceptorium of legal 
empiricism and hence within the scope of socio-legal analysis. 
Nonetheless, much hard conceptual and methodological work 
remains to be done. In particular, performances and performatives 
often intertwine with one another and with the institutionalized 
practices that they accompany. Few would deny that legal institutions 
exhibit an elective affinity with performative speech, but we currently 
lack a strong theory of when and why legal causation works through 
such words—and when and why, instead, it works through the 
nonverbal devices of space and time and wealth and force. 
IV. THE AMBIGUOUS PROMISE OF LEGAL CORPUS LINGUISTICS 
Hamann and Vogel describe CAL2 as aspiring to become “a new 
transdiscipline, combining big-data corpus research with its own 
epistemological focus on the language of legal practice, distinct from 
the plain meaning and original intent traditions.”41 This is a 
 
 40.  It is interesting, in this context, to note that whereas jurors “announce” a verdict, 
performing a speech ritual that merely reports prior deliberative actions, judges “pronounce” a 
sentence, uttering performative words that invoke a new state of the world. 
 41.  Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1475. 
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commendably ambitious agenda. If only more legal scholars would 
attempt such big things! However, Hamann and Vogel’s ambition can 
be read in several distinct ways. 
At times, they seem to envision CAL2 as a scholarly method for 
better discerning the Law—that is, as an empirical toolkit for clarifying 
legal concepts by revealing when and how particular terms and 
constructions appear with one another or are used or avoided by 
particular speakers. This resembles the use, illustrated elsewhere in this 
symposium, of extra-legal corpora to assess “plain meaning” and 
“original intent”; and Hamann and Vogel acknowledge that these 
cognate American efforts “probably differ [from CAL2] more in their 
source material (laypeople language vs. expert language) than in their 
conceptual underpinning.”42 Significantly, this distinctly scholarly 
vision of legal corpus linguistics also resembles traditional doctrinal 
legal scholarship—albeit with a fortifying infusion of big-data 
empiricism. CAL2, American “public meaning” research, and 
traditional doctrinalism all rest on the ontological premises that: (a) 
legal language has a single true meaning, (b) this true meaning is 
systematic enough to form an orderly conceptual structure, and (c) 
this conceptual structure provides a useful normative foundation (or 
at least a necessary degree of transparency and predictability) to guide 
public policy. CAL2, “public meaning” linguistics, and doctrinalism 
also all rest on the epistemological premise that the true meaning of a 
legal text can be discerned by reading it in the light of other, related 
texts. Admittedly, the three approaches differ in their views about 
which types of texts one must include, how many texts one must 
examine, and to what degree the examination must be statistical versus 
impressionistic.43 But these differences are no greater than the other 
divisions of topic, ideology, and style that typically divide law faculties; 
and peaceful coexistence—or even fruitful collaboration—seems 
 
 42.  Id. at 1495. 
 43.  To some degree, traditional doctrinalism also stands apart from corpus linguistics 
(whether of the CAL2 or public-meaning variety) on the question of whether legal interpretation 
can and should be made empirical rather than introspective. As suggested above, many 
doctrinalists favor the humanistic variety of interpretivism, reading legal texts for subjective 
inspiration and insight, rather than for objective evidence. Few such scholars would embrace the 
proposition that corpus linguistics can render normative and philosophical matters empirical 
simply by toting up the number of utterances on each side. Indeed, some might argue, who 
needs doctrinal scholarship if majority usages are never wrong? 
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easily  achievable. In this vision, corpus linguistics represents what 
business- strategy researchers would call a “competence-enhancing 
technological discontinuit[y]”44: different and valuable, yes; but 
fundamentally disruptive, no. 
At other times, however, Hamann and Vogel seem to envision 
CAL2 as something more radical. Particularly when they link CAL2 to 
the larger agenda of “evidence-based jurisprudence,”45 they conjure 
an image of law scholarship that would shift legal academia away from 
its current affinity with moral philosophy, welfare economics, and 
literary interpretation, toward a more “praxeological”46 concern with 
bottom-line lawyering. Hamann and Vogel posit that “[l]awyers like 
doctors are interested in reality (only) insofar as their practical 
decision-making requires.”47 But the practical decision-making of 
lawyers differs from that of doctors in a fundamental way: Doctors’ 
decisions confront an extrinsic physical reality that must be 
understood empirically before it can be mastered clinically; lawyers’ 
decisions, in contrast, confront only the intrinsic socio-cultural reality 
of legal institutions staffed by fellow legal professionals. Doctors cure 
diseases; lawyers persuade colleagues. Given that legal persuasion is 
heavily verbal, corpus linguistics could, in fact, prove to be a useful 
legal tool; but in this more pragmatic vision, it would serve not the 
scholarly agendas of truth and justice but the lawyerly agendas of 
advocacy and effectuation. By determining empirically which word 
combinations elicit which legal outcomes, practitioners could argue 
more compellingly (or more performatively) toward any given ends 
whether or not those ends were morally just, socially beneficent, or 
logically coherent.48 Using the label “Linguistic Legal Realism” and 
 
 44.  Michael L. Tushman & Philip Anderson, Technological Discontinuities and 
Organizational Environments, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 439, 450 (1986). 
 45.  Hamann & Vogel, supra note 1, at 1495. 
 46.  Id. at 1484. 
 47.  Id. (quoting Hanjo Hamann, EVIDENZBASIERTE JURISPRUDENZ: METHODEN 
EMPIRISCHER FORSCHUNG UND IHR ERKENNTNISWERT FÜR DAS RECHT AM BEISPIEL DES 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS 7–8 (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2014) (Ger.)). 
 48.  This, I take it, is what Hamann and Vogel mean by “a new corpus driven macro 
perspective on the constitution of dogmatics—language, knowledge and power.” Id. at1495. 
Significantly, they contrast this dogmatic agenda with earlier efforts to develop “electronic 
brains” to generate “more objective, more predictable, more just and less complex legal decision-
making.” Id. at 1494. In other words, whereas the earlier agenda sought to use legal corpora to 
improve the overall health of the system (as assessed by extrinsic criteria, such as predictability 
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citing Holmes’s Path of the Law,49 Hamann and Vogel implicitly 
acknowledge that this is a legal linguistics for the bad man: it cares less 
about what legal words mean than about what they do. 50 Used in this 
way, corpus linguistics would quite possibly represent a “competence-
destroying”51 discontinuity within the legal academy, elevating clinical 
practice to new prominence while pushing doctrinal interpretation, 
economic efficiency analysis, and moral philosophy to the margins. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In all honesty, I must confess that neither of these agendas holds 
much appeal to me as an empirical sociologist. Nonetheless, legal 
corpus linguistics holds a great deal of appeal for separate reasons of 
my own. 
I am skeptical about whether corpus linguistics can reveal the true 
meaning of legal language because, in accord with the Legal Realists, 
I am skeptical that language can ever have a single, stable, true 
meaning, independent of particular speakers, particular audiences, and 
the particular purposes of each. In a few very special cases, the speaker, 
the audience, and the purpose may be so explicit and narrow that 
something like a “plain meaning” becomes apparent; but most legal 
words are uttered by multiple speakers to multiple audiences in 
multiple contexts. As a result, multiple usages often enjoy substantial 
currency alongside one another, and several of the most popular 
usages are likely to have been familiar to both the speaker and the 
audience(s) at the moment when the utterance was made. Moreover, 
some of the most important utterances—constitutional compromises, 
landmark legislation, breakthrough contracts—are intentionally 
ambiguous, reflecting agreement on words but not on substance. In 
 
and justice), the new agenda focuses on the more pragmatic project of determining how 
practicing lawyers “succeed at convincing or out-writing opponents.” Id. at 1496. 
 49.  Id. at 1494. 
 50.  This characterization may be overly harsh. If one believes that skillful legal 
representation generally leads to more just, predictable, or economically efficient outcomes, then 
the use of linguistic evidence to improve lawyers’ skills may lead not only to direct benefits for 
clients (who will, at least occasionally, be “bad men”), but also to indirect benefits for society as 
a whole.  The distinctive feature of the praxeological use of legal linguistics, however, is that it 
gives top priority to improving lawyers’ rhetorical skills, while potentially de-emphasizing such 
other skills as logical deduction, cost-benefit optimization, and ethical judgement. 
 51.  Tushman & Anderson, supra note 44. 
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effect, each party implicitly gambles that the chosen verbal formula 
will eventually be interpreted favorably to that party’s interests by 
some unknown third-party audience at some unknown future date.52 
Corpus linguistics may still be useful for determining “plain meaning” 
in such cases—but only after a prior determination (by ideology or by 
power) that certain speakers, audiences, contexts, and usages are 
relevant, while others are not. As a sociologist, that prior 
determination strikes me as the socio-legally interesting moment, after 
which the findings of the corpus analysis will be largely predetermined. 
I am equally skeptical of Hamann and Vogel’s more radical 
“praxeological” agenda, albeit on quite different grounds. First, I am 
skeptical that the causal efficacy of legal words can be gleaned from a 
research agenda that confines itself to Cell 1 in Table 1’s typology of 
legal and extra-legal processes (Law  Law) and Cell 4 in Table 2’s 
typology of linguistic and nonlinguistic processes (Text  Text). 
Although I do not deny the causal potential of legal words, I doubt 
that the actual impact of legal words can be accurately gauged without 
controlling for confounding variables in the nontextual aspects of law 
and the nonlegal aspects of social life. Second, I think that Hamann 
and Vogel underestimate the reflexivity of legal practice. Legal words 
are not a chemical vaccine operating on insentient microbes53; they are 
communicative devices carrying both ostensible meanings and 
subtextual signals. Even if corpus linguistics succeeds in identifying 
distinctively efficacious utterances in prior legal speech, there is no 
guarantee that those utterances will remain efficacious in the same way 
and to the same degree once their distinctive efficacy becomes widely 
known and disingenuously exploited. Teaching shepherds to cry 
“wolf” may seem like a useful lesson, but only until a corpus linguist 
comes along to reveal how efficacious that utterance is even in the 
absence of actual wolves. Third, as a social scientist with no 
professional obligation to train legal practitioners, I am not overly 
excited about the project of teaching lawyers how to select the most 
efficacious power words, especially if this comes at the expense of 
teaching them how to recognize and promote just and orderly social 
 
 52.  See, e.g., JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 133–61 (1989); Vicki Eaton Baier, James G. March & Harald 
Saetren, Implementation and Ambiguity, 2 SCANDINAVIAN J. MGMT. STUD. 197 (1986). 
 53. Cf. ROBERT L. KIDDER, CONNECTING LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
RESEARCH AND THEORY 112–43 (1983) (critiquing a “vaccine model” of legal impact). 
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arrangements—or at least how to recognize the scope and limits of 
power words in the face of other less loquacious social forces. In short, 
although I can imagine standing apart from this praxeological 
enterprise and analyzing its progress as a study in the sociology of 
knowledge, I cannot imagine embracing its agenda as my own. 
Instead, my enthusiasm for legal corpus linguistics rests on very 
different disciplinary grounds. To me, legal documents and the 
corpora composed of them are intriguing as social artifacts—the 
intentional products of particular social communities at particular 
times.54 As such, they provide a cultural window into the past, and 
their variations across time and place provide a fossil record of socio-
legal change. Admittedly, words-as-artifacts are often harder to 
interpret than either objects-as-artifacts or words-as-text: Beneath 
their communicative plain meaning, documentary artifacts may have 
both performative technical properties and symbolic subtextual 
resonances. And the same document may serve different purposes in 
different communities: having one role for the private individuals who 
crafted it; other roles for the various publics who stand before it as 
subjects or view it from afar as spectators; and yet other roles for 
the  specialized professionals who bear responsibility for its 
implementation, curation, modification, and diffusion. Nonetheless, 
legal corpora provide unparalleled opportunities for big-data, longue-
durée55 cultural analysis. Cross-sectionally, we can compare them to 
other contemporaneous corpora from literature, politics, science, or 
other domains; longitudinally, we can trace their evolution as the legal 
community expands, matures, and professionalizes. They may never 
tell us the “true” meaning of the Law, and they may never generate a 
comprehensive how-to manual for efficacious legal speech; but they 
may certainly shed empirical light on our social world and on the 
political, cultural, psychological, and economic forces that make 
it run. 
In the end, however, the empirical value of legal corpora may 
depend less on methodological ambition than on methodological 
humility. Legal corpora seem destined to become a useful and versatile 
 
 54.  Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 91 (2003). 
 55.  Fernand Braudel, Histoire et Sciences Sociales: La Longue Durée, 13 ANNALES. 
ÉCONOMIES, SOCIÉTÉS, CIVILISATIONS 725 (1958) (Fr.) (arguing that historians should analyze 
long-term shifts and continuities in social structure, rather than merely chronicle salient but 
fleeting historical events). 
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tool in the social-scientific toolkit; but in themselves, they can never 
be a panacea. To understand society empirically through legal 
linguistics, we must pursue linguistic empiricism in all its registers—
descriptive, configurational, interpretive, and causal. We must also 
couple empirical knowledge about legal linguistics with empirical 
knowledge about the many other, nonlinguistic aspects of law and of 
legal institutions. And, perhaps most importantly, we must couple 
empirical knowledge about law in all its aspects with commensurately 
deep and subtle empirical knowledge about the other facets of social 
life. For socio-legal empiricists, “law and society” must always be a 
conjunction, not a mere intersection. Nothing in legal corpus 
linguistics changes this fundamental truth. 
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